San Diego business lawyer

Appellant consumer group sued respondent oil corporation and alleged that the corporation was responsible for toxic substances to leech in the soil from the gas stations that the corporation owned. The consumer group and the corporation stipulated to a judgment in favor of the corporation in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) based on a ruling involving the same parties in a different court. The consumer group appealed.

The consumer group's suit was filed in 1999, but the most recent date the corporation had operated the gas stations that were the subject of the lawsuit was August 1995. As such, the only theory of liability potentially applicable to the corporation was that the "continued presence" or "passive migration" of designated chemicals in the soil or groundwater constituted a "discharge" or "release" within the meaning of Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.5 The appellate court held that as the terms "discharge" and "release" were not defined within the ballot initiative that was the basis for the statute, the terms had to be construed in a manner that would be commonly understood by the electorate. In relying on the dictionary terms of the words, the San Diego business lawyer held that "discharge" and "release" as used in § 25249.5 referred to a movement of chemicals from a confined space into the land or the water. The subsequent passive migration of chemicals through the soil or water after having been so discharged or released by a party did not constitute another discharge or release within the meaning of § 25249.5. Thus, the judgment was affirmed.

The judgment of the trial court in favor of the corporation was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, a boxing referee and his wife, appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County (California), which sustained the demurrer of defendants, the State of California, the California Department of Consumer Affairs, and the California State Athletic Commission, and dismissed a complaint alleging that the State violated a mandatory duty under Gov. Code, § 815.6, by failing to test a boxer for HIV before issuing a license.

The boxer who was licensed without submitting a negative HIV test later tested positive for HIV, after having participated in a boxing match in which the referee could have been exposed to HIV through contact with the boxer's blood. The court held that the California State Athletic Commission had a mandatory duty, within the meaning of Gov. Code, §§ 815, 815.6, to require a boxer to provide a negative HIV test from an approved laboratory before issuing the annual boxing license. The statute imposing the duty, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 18712, used mandatory language and did not grant discretion to waive the HIV test requirement or to allow a boxer to participate in a match without providing a negative HIV test. The court further held that the State was not entitled to licensing immunity under Gov. Code, § 818.4, because the denial of a boxing license or authorization to participate in a boxing match if the applicant could not produce the specified proof of a negative HIV test was a mandatory duty and not a discretionary decision. Granting a boxing license and allowing the boxer to participate in a match without submitting a negative HIV test was a violation of this mandatory duty.

 

The court reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer.