Plaintiff developer filed an action for breach of contract against defendant plumbing contractor. The contractor filed a cross-complaint alleging, inter alia, breach of contract by the developer. The contractor appealed a judgment entered after the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, granted a motion for nonsuit on the contractor's cross-complaint in favor of the developer.
The court held that a defendant's answer containing a general denial of the material allegations of the contractor's claim pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (b)(1), was sufficient to “controvert” the contractor's allegation of licensure, and thus invoked the requirement of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (d), that the contractor prove licensure by producing a verified certificate. The contractor could have had available for trial a verified certificate of its licensure, or could have clarified by way of contention interrogatories whether the developer intended to contest the validity of its license, but it did neither. As per corporate law attorney it was not accurate to say, as did the contractor, that the developer did not raise the issue until mid-trial; the developer's general denial placed the issue in controversy. Nor could the developer's conduct be described as sandbagging, where the clear weight of the statutory burden fell on the contractor to prove its licensure. Because the trial court was not required to delay the case for the contractor to obtain the verified certificate that it should have obtained before the trial began, it did not abuse of discretion in denying a continuance.
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Appellant father sought review of orders from the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which modified the child support awarded to respondent mother and awarded sanctions and attorney fees to the mother.
After entry of the parties' final divorce decree, the father sold a profitable business and invested in several startup companies, which experienced significant operating losses. He did not disclose to the mother the amount of sale proceeds or certain other financial information until she sought formal discovery. The court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under Fam. Code, § 4058, subd. (b), when it imputed income to the father's business assets to determine earning capacity. In light of the father's decision to invest in companies that would predictably operate at a loss for some period of time, instead of income-producing assets, the trial court had authority under Fam. Code, § 4057, subd. (b)(5), to deviate from the child support guideline in the best interests of the children under Fam. Code, § 4053. The trial court erred in sanctioning the father under Fam. Code, §§ 271, 2107, because his fiduciary duty of disclosure under Fam. Code, §§ 2100, 2102, subd. (c), ended upon the entry of the final divorce decree. An award of attorney fees based on relative need was proper under Fam. Code, §§ 2030, subd. (a), 2032, even if the mother had the ability to pay.
The court reversed with respect to the award of sanctions, remanded for further proceedings related to that issue, and otherwise affirmed.
