Plaintiff publisher appealed the decision from the Superior Court of San Joaquin County (California), which granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant members of the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Stockton, finding plaintiff's complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action under the Brown Act (Act), Cal. Gov't. Code § 54950 et seq.
Defendant members of the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Stockton were the legislative body under the Community Redevelopment Law, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33000 et seq., and, through the agency attorney, conducted a telephone poll for the purpose of obtaining a collective agreement on the transfer of ownership of real property. In negligence CACI his complaint, plaintiff publisher alleged that the series of telephone conversations violated the notice and open-meeting requirements in Cal. Gov't. Code § 54960 of the Brown Act (Act), Cal. Gov't. Code § 54950 et seq. The trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the Act. The court held that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action because the series of one-to-one nonpublic and unnoticed telephone conversations between defendants and the agency's attorney constituted a meeting within Cal. Gov't. Code § 54953 at which action, under Cal. Gov't. Code § 5492.6, action was taken to approve the transfer of ownership of redevelopment property.
The judgment on the pleadings finding that plaintiff publisher failed to state a cause of action on his complaint alleging a violation of open meeting statute was reversed and remanded, because a series of telephone contacts between defendant members of the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Stockton and the agency attorney to effect the transfer of real estate constituted a meeting on public business within the statute.
Appellant Franchise Tax Board challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County (California), and affirmed by the Court of Appeal that held that California's formula apportionment method of taxation was unconstitutional as applied to foreign-based unitary groups.
Respondent taxpayers brought a refund action to recover assessments levied against them by appellant Franchise Tax Board for the 1977 tax year. The assessments were based on a finding that, together with respondents' United Kingdom-based corporate parent and worldwide subsidiaries, respondents comprised a unitary enterprise subjecting it to appellant's three-factor mathematical formula to apportion the interjurisdictional income of a unitary business for state corporate income tax purposes. The appellate court and the trial court held that the formula apportionment method violated the foreign commerce clause and was unconstitutional as applied to foreign-based unitary groups. The court concluded that, although executive officials had repeatedly attempted to prohibit formula apportionment, the United States Congress had repeatedly refused to do so. The court held that there was a clear federal intent not to prohibit the states from employing formula apportionment in taxing multinational businesses. The court held that the question as to whether formula apportionment violated the due process clause was a factual question to be determined by the appellate court.
The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and concluded the employing of formula apportionment by the state in taxing the income of multinational unitary businesses did not violate the foreign commerce clause. The court remanded to the appellate court to determine if the cost of producing the required financial data for formula apportionment violated respondent taxpayers' due process rights.
