The minor child involved in a parental termination proceeding sought appointment of separate counsel on appeal.
Appellants appealed from and order terminating their parental rights pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(b)(1). Counsel appointed by the trial court moved to appoint an attorney to represent the minor on appeal. The court of appeals denied the request. Counsel for the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was capable of representing the minor's interests in her parent's appeal. Appointment of separate counsel would have only been appropriate had there been a conflict of interests between the DCFS and the minor. No such conflict was demonstrated in this case. The position taken on appeal by counsel for DCFS was that expressed by the minor's separate attorney in the trial court
The request for appointment of separate counsel for the minor child on appeal was denied because there was no conflict of Business dispute lawyer interest or any other circumstance which would have required appointment of separate counsel.
Petitioner, the defendant in an underlying action, sought a writ of mandate to command respondent, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), to vacate an order granting an attorney's application for admission pro hac vice pursuant to Cal. R. Ct. 983(a), claiming the attorney requesting admission regularly engaged in substantial business in California, and made repeated appearances pursuant to rule 983(a).
Petitioner, defendant in an underlying action, sought a writ of mandate to order respondent lower court to vacate its order granting an application for admission pro hac vice pursuant to Cal. R. Ct. 983(a). Petitioner claimed the attorney requesting admission regularly engaged in substantial business in California, and made repeated appearances pursuant to rule 983(a), therefore was excepted from admission. The court found that the attorney requesting admission had made only one other appearance under rule 983(a), therefore, was not ineligible on that ground. The court looked to the contacts the attorney had with the state and found he lived and practiced law primarily in Arizona, made 11 trips to California over the course of three years, and that most of the contacts were by telephone and correspondence. The court found the ordinary interpretation of the words "activities in the state of California" within the meaning of rule 983(a) were meant to require activities performed in California, not elsewhere. The court held the lower court did not abuse its discretion in the limited admission of the attorney, and denied the writ of mandate.
Writ of mandate was denied for petitioner, defendant in an underlying action, because respondent lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an attorney pro hac vice. The court held the attorney was not ineligible for admission because his contacts with the state through telephone calls and correspondence were not "activities in the state of California" within the meaning of the Rules of Court.
