Plaintiff, a voluntary association of Southern Baptist churches, sued defendants, a Baptist church, a nondenominational church, and its pastor, seeking enforcement of a reversionary clause contained in the Baptist church's constitution. The Monterey County Superior Court, California, entered judgment in favor of the association and ordered enforcement of the reversionary clause. The Baptist church and the nondenominational church appealed.
The reversionary clause provided that the Baptist church's assets would pass to the association if the Baptist church were dissolved or ceased to be a Southern Baptist church. The instant court concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the Baptist church had ceased to be Southern Baptist. Such a determination necessarily required the trial court to decide issues involving religious doctrine, polity, and practice, an undertaking forbidden by the First Amendment. However, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether there had been a dissolution or winding up of the organization, as this determination did not involve the trial court in any religious issues. The evidence supported the trial court's finding that the Baptist church had violated the rules set forth in its own constitution and bylaws for governance of its affairs. The Business attorney in California evidence also supported the trial court's finding that the Baptist church had “de facto dissolved” by voting to dissolve at a regularly scheduled meeting of the membership. The instant court found no error in the language of the judgment ordering the transfer of the Baptist church's assets to the association.
Real party in interest union sought review of a decision from the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three (California), which, in an administrative mandate action brought by plaintiff county against defendant agency after a hearing officer ordered the county to disclose nonmember employees' contact information to the union, ruled that the union could obtain contact information only for nonmember employees who failed to object.
The union requested contact information for employees in bargaining units covered by agency shop provisions. The county objected that disclosure of contact information would violate nonmembers' privacy rights. The court held that the contact information was presumptively relevant to the union's duty of fair representation; thus, the county's duty to bargain in good faith under Gov. Code, § 3505, encompassed an obligation to provide the information. The county's disclosure obligation, which also arose in part from Gov. Code, § 3503, was not limited by Gov. Code, § 3507, subd. (a)(8). Although nonmember employees had a privacy interest under Cal. Const., art. I, § 1, in maintaining the privacy of their home addresses and telephone numbers, a balancing of interests favored disclosure of the information because direct communication between the union and the employees was essential to keep the employees informed and to ensure that their opinions were heard. The court of appeal overstepped its authority under Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (f), by ordering specific notice and opt-out procedures, which interfered with agency discretion.
The court reversed the decision of the court of appeal and remanded for entry of judgment denying the county's petition for writ of mandate.
