Plaintiff proponents of a ballot measure that proposed the repeal of a utility users tax imposed by defendant city sued the city challenging the validity of a number of actions taken by the city regarding the measure. The trial court granted the city's special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's judgment. Review was granted.
The instant court concluded that the appellate court, relying primarily on Gov. Code, § 54964, applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the validity of the city's conduct. The Business lawyers in Los Angeles appellate court's reading of § 54964 was fundamentally flawed because the statute did not affirmatively authorize a municipality to expend public funds on a communication that did not expressly advocate the approval or rejection of a ballot measure, but instead simply prohibited a municipality's use of public funds for communications that expressly advocate such a position. A municipality's expenditure of public funds for materials or activities that reasonably were characterized as campaign materials or activities was not authorized by § 54964, even when the message delivered through such means did not meet the express-advocacy standard. Nonetheless, the appellate court reached the correct result in affirming the trial court's order granting the city's motion to strike because the challenged communications did not, as a matter of law, constitute improper campaign materials or activities. All of the activities of the city that were challenged by plaintiffs constituted permissible informational activities.
The judgment of the appellate court was affirmed.
Appellant college professor challenged the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which sustained respondent police department's demurrer in a taxpayer's challenge alleging violation of freedom of speech and of assembly as well as of the state constitutional right of privacy.
The court reversed the decision of the trial court, which sustained respondent police department's demurrer in appellant college professor's taxpayer challenge alleging violation of freedom of speech and of assembly as well as of the state constitutional right of privacy. Appellant claimed, inter alia, that members of the Los Angeles Police Department, serving as secret informers and undercover agents, registered as students at UCLA, attended classes held at the university and submitted reports to the police department of discussions occurring in such classes. The complaint also alleged that the reports and dossiers compiled by the police pursuant to these covert surveillance activities pertained to no illegal activity or acts. The court agreed, holding that the demurrer to the complaint was improperly sustained. The court found that respondent's conduct presumptively violated both state and federal constitutions, reasoning that because of the potentially substantial inhibition of free expression and association posed by the police department's alleged covert surveillance of university classes and organization meetings.
The court reversed the trial court's demurrer in appellant college professor's challenge alleging violation of freedom of speech, assembly, and the state constitutional right of privacy. Police conduct violated both state and federal constitutions because of the potentially substantial inhibition of free expression and association posed by the police department's alleged covert surveillance of university classes and organization meetings.
