Petitioner sought a writ of mandate seeking to vacate the trial court (California) order squashing his subpoena for the production of business records.
Petitioner served upon respondent a subpoena for the production of business records that included the transcript of a deposition. Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which was granted. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate. The Class action defense attorney denied petitioner's writ. According to the court, the deposition transcript was not a business record within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2020. The court held that business records meant an item, collection, or grouping of information about a business entity. The court stated that the information sought by petitioner did not fit the definition. The court held that the deposition was a product of respondent's business, not a record of its business. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner could not get the deposition transcript by means of subpoena to avoid the high cost of the transcript.
The appeals court denied petitioner's writ of mandate because the deposition transcript was not a business record but rather a product of respondent's business.
Plaintiff music companies appealed an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which granted defendants', individuals in a law partnership, individual and business entities, and fictitious parties, motions to quash service of summons in plaintiffs' action alleging unfair competition and unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff music companies commenced a class action alleging unfair competition and unjust enrichment against defendants, individuals in a law partnership, individual and business entities, and fictitious parties. Service of process was made on all of the named defendants by handing copies of the summons and the complaint to defendants' attorney as agent for each of the defendants. The defendants moved to quash service of summons on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the moving because their attorney was not a person authorized by such defendants to receive service of process in their behalf. Each of the motions to quash service of summons was granted. On appeal, the court affirmed as to defendant business entities, holding that defendant business entities could not have been served pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.90 because they were not individuals. The court reversed as to all other defendants, holding that the nature of the services performed by their attorney and the necessity for his repeated communication with defendants made it "highly probable" that defendants would receive actual notice of the service of process.
The court affirmed the grant of the motion to quash service of summons as to defendant business entities, holding that defendant business entities could not have been served through their attorney because they were not individuals. The court reversed as to all other defendants, holding that it was "highly probable" that defendants would receive actual notice of the service of process.
