Appellant salesmen sought review of an order of the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which required them as well as an equipment lessee to pay damages to respondent equipment lessor when the equipment lessee breached a lease agreement with respondent and appellants induced the breach. Appellants contended that the trial court should have required respondent to mitigate his damages by re-leasing the equipment.
Appellant salesmen assisted in the sale of a business where the seller (lessee) had a lease agreement with respondent equipment lessor to include an assumption of the lease in any contract to sell his business. Appellants induced the lessee to leave out the assumption provision stating that the agreement was invalid. Respondent filed an action against all of them for damages, attorney fees, and cost. The trial Los Angeles business lawyers found that appellants and the lessee were jointly and severally liable for damages. Appellants sought review contending that the trial court improperly measured damages and they should have required respondent to mitigate his damages by re-leasing the equipment he received back from lessee. The court affirmed the amount of damages awarded to respondent, but modified the order to provide the sum awarded should bear interest from the date of the judgment. The court stated that the rule of mitigation of damages was not applicable to respondent because its imposition would have deprived him the benefit of subsequent contracts which would have been available to him irrespective of the breach.
The court affirmed the amount of damages awarded to respondent, but modified the order to provide the sum awarded bear interest from the date of the judgment. The court stated that the rule of mitigation of damages was not applicable to respondent because its imposition would have deprived him the benefit of subsequent contracts, which would have been available to him irrespective of the breach.
Plaintiff city resident appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which concluded that defendant, the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation created by the city, could meet in closed session with legal counsel for the city's redevelopment agency under Gov. Code, § 54956.9, of the Brown Act, Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.
In connection with its role in approving the settlement of eminent domain litigation, the board conferred with an outside law firm hired by the agency to litigate the eminent domain lawsuits. The publicly posted agendas announcing these meetings noted that they would take place in closed session pursuant to Gov. Code, § 54956.9, and indicated the specific eminent domain lawsuits that were to be discussed. After the meetings, the corporation published minutes, which typically indicated that the board received a report from special counsel for the agency in closed session regarding the litigation, and on occasion, that the board had given direction regarding a potential settlement. The court held that, according to the clear terms of § 54956.9, the general rules of attorney-client privilege did not apply to determine whether a meeting with legal counsel could be held in closed session. The court was required to narrowly interpret exceptions to the Brown Act's open meeting requirements, and the Brown Act did not expressly authorize one local agency to delegate to a second local agency the authority to meet in closed session with legal counsel.
The court reversed the trial court's judgment denying the relief sought by the resident and instructed the trial court to order declaratory and mandamus relief against the board's practice of meeting in closed session with legal counsel for the agency regarding the agency's eminent domain litigation.
