Appellant patient challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) on the basis that its damages award under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act was not properly subject to reduction pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2.
The court held that damages awarded to appellant patient under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) were properly subject to reduction pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2. The court found that § 3333.2 imposed a cap on the liability of a health care provider for non-economic damages in an action based on professional negligence. The basis of California class action lawyers appellant's suit was that respondent hospital transferred appellant's daughter to another hospital without first providing treatment required to stabilize her emergency medical condition in violation of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd. On review, the court addressed the issue of whether the award granted appellant was subject to the monetary limit on non-economic damages under § 3333.2. The court found that federal courts in making similar determinations had looked at the underlying conduct challenged and its legal basis to determine whether, if brought under state law, it would constitute a cause of action subject to the cap. The court held that a claim based on a failure to stabilize under the EMTALA would constitute an action subject to § 3333.2 and thus was subject to the cap.
The court affirmed the order which reduced the damages award to appellant patient on the basis that the underlying claim for failure to stabilize under the applicable federal law constituted a cause of action subject to the cap for non-economic damages in an action based on professional negligence.
Plaintiff first wife challenged the decision of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which denied the first wife separate maintenance but rendered a judgment in her favor in lieu of her rights in the community property. The action was brought against defendants, husband and second wife, for separate maintenance and a share of the property which the first wife claims is the community property.
The action was brought because the husband married the second wife under the mistaken impression that he had divorced the first wife. The court concluded that the issue was what part of the judgment, if any, could have been sustained in view of the fact that the trial court awarded a part of the community property to the first wife but struck the allowance for separate maintenance from the judgment and deleted the finding of willful neglect. The court reasoned that no doubt the trial judge endeavored to reach a practical and perhaps just solution of the difficult problem but, community property in either divorce or maintenance actions had to have been equally divided. The court affirmed the portions of the judgment adjudicating the husband's ownership of one-half of the real and personal property, and vacating certain transfers of his interests to the second wife, but reversed and remanded the remainder of the judgment. The court held that the action of the trial court in striking out the finding of wilful neglect, coupled with the insertion of the provision giving the first wife less than one-half of the community property, made it necessary to reverse the judgment.
In the first wife's action against the husband and the second wife, for separate maintenance and community property, the court affirmed the attorney fees and the portions of the judgment adjudicating the husband's ownership of one-half of the real and personal property, and vacating certain transfers of his interests to the second wife. In all other respects the judgment was reversed and the action remanded for a new trial.
